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Executive Summary
Competition in many important industries centers oninvestment in intellec-
tual property. Firms engage in dynamic,Schumpeterian competition for the
market, through sequential winner-take-all racesto produce drastic innova-
tions, rather than through staticprice/output competition in the market. Sound
antitrust economic analysis of such industriesrequires explicit consideration of
dynamic competition. Most leading firmsin these dynamically competitive in-
dustries have considerable short-nmmarket power, for instance, but ignoring
their vulnerability to drastic innovation mayyield misleading conclusions.
Similarly, conventional tests for predation cannotdiscriminate between prac-
tices that increase and those that decrease consumerwelfare in winner-take-all
industries. Finally, innovation in dynamicallycompetitive industries often in-
volves enhancing feature sets; there is nosound economic basis for treating
such enhancements as per se ifiegal ties.
I.Introduction
This paper is about the economicsof antitrust in industries that are un-
dergoing rapid technological changeand in which competition centers
on investment inintellectual property In many of these industries,
firms engage in dynamic competitionfor the marketusually through
research-and-development (R&D) competition todevelop the "killer"
product, service, or feature that will confermarket leadership and thus
diminish or eliminate actual or potentialrivals. Static price/output
competition on the margin in the market isless important.
Heavy investment in the creation ofintellectual property typically
results in significant scale economies,leading to substantial seller con-
centration.' Market leadership maynevertheless be contestable as a
result of the constant threat of drasticinnovations by rivals. In the pop-
ular press, these industries are sometimesreferred to as new-economy or2 Evans and Schmalensee
high-technology. Many have aspects thateconomists would call
Schumpeterian, after the economist who describedthe process of "cre-
ative destruction" whereby innovation destroys oldindustries and cre-
ates new ones.2 In contrast, in old-economy industries,competition takes
place primarily through traditional price/outputcompetition on the
margin in the market and through incremental innovation,not through
efforts to create drasticmarket-destroying_mnnovatjons.3
The federal antitrust enforcementagencies have viewed new-
economy industries as particularly susceptible to breakdownsin com-
petition and thus deserving of particularly closeantitrust scrutiny.4 We
argue that this broad-brush approach is unlikely to enhanceconsumer
welfare. We do not contend that dynamicallycompetitive industries
should be immune to careful antitrustscrutiny, nor that the basic prin-
ciples of antitrust should be modified in thesesectors. Fixing prices or
preventing competitors from distributing their productswill generally
harm consumers even if dynamic competitionis vigorous. Nonethe-
less, the application of antitrust principles shouldtake account of the
important ways new-economy industries differ fromtraditional ones.
In recent decades, carefuluse of economic analysis has generally
aligned antitrust policy more closely with theinterests of consumers.
To continue this trend, antitrust policymust reflect the features of dy-
namically competitive industries (manynew-economy industries) that
differentiate them from statically competitiveindustries (most old-
economy industries).
Section II briefly documents the growingimportance of new-
economy industries, identifies some important industriesin which
competition is mainly dynamic, and discusses keyeconomic aspects of
new-economy industries. Section III considers how the centralfeatures
of new-economy industries affect the marketdefinition and market
power analysis that have become central to the practice ofantitrust
economics. Section IV examines how theseeconomic characteristics af-
fect the analysis of predation claimschargesthat a business has acted
to exclude or eliminate rivals to acquireor maintain a monopoly. Sec-
tion V then examines the antitrusteconomics of tyingrequiring cus-
tomers to purchase one productas a condition of purchasing
anotherin new-economy industries. Finally, SectionVI summarizes
lessons for antitrust policy in thenew economy. Although our analysis
applies generally, we draw our examples inSections Ill-V mainly from
United States v. Microsoft Corp., the leadingantitrust case to date involv-
ing a new-economy industry.5Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 3
II.New-Economy Industries
What's New?
The defining feature of new-economy industries is a competitive pro-
cess dominated by efforts to createintellectual property through R&D,
which often results in rapid and disruptive technological change.Par-
ticularly at the height of the boom in "dot-corn" stock prices, many au-
thors have exaggerated the importance of suchindustries and of
intellectual property more generally. Nonetheless, the U.S. economy
has undergone an important transformation in the last 30 yearsthat
has resulted in much "creative destruction" and increased investment
in innovation.6 Table 1.1 compares the U.S. companies with the20 larg-
est market capitalizations at the end of 1970, 1985,and 2000. Only five
companies from the 1970 and 1985 lists (IBM, GeneralElectric, BP
Amoco, Exxon Mobil, and Coca-Cola) made the top 20in 2000; more
than half of the companies on the 2000 list did not even exist in1970, in-
cluding Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Oracle, and EMC.7 The topthree
firms in 1970 (IBM, AT&T, and General Motors) were still in the topfive
in 1985 but had been substantially displaced by 2000. AT&Tand Gen-
eral Motors fell out of the top 20 altogether, whileIBMan "old"
new-economy company that barely survivedthe drastic innovations
that sharply reduced the demand for its mainframecomputersfell to
18th place.
Many of the new firms on the list in 2000 are part ofwhat has come
to be called the new economy: companieswhose fortunes are tied to suc-
cess in the creation of intellectual propertyand are highly vulnerable to
successful innovation by others. The firms listed in 1970 and 1985 but
not in 2000 are what have come to be called theold-economy companies:
firms whose fortunes are tied to the use of mature technologiesin
which drastic innovation is rare, such as food manufacturingand pe-
troleum production. For example, 1999 R&D expendituresaveraged
3.6% of sales for still-existing companies that had been onthe top-20
list for 1970 and 3.0% for those on the 1985 list, whilethe average ratio
was 6.8% for the companies on thetop-20 list for 2000.8
We see the increased importance of the creation ofintellectual prop-
erty in other ways. Company-funded R&D as a percentageof GDP was
generally below 1.0% from 1958 to 1979; it was generally above 1.4%in
the 1990s.9 In 1950 not one of the 100 highest valued firms spent more

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 5
exceeded this level. But in 1999, 38 of the 100 highest valuedfirms
spent at least 5% of revenue on R&D, with 22firms spending more than
10%. 10
The new economy is almost synonymous with theinformation-
technology industries. Of course, these industries, broadlydefined,
have been around for a long time. The Bell System, formedin the late
nineteenth century was a network industry created by a revolutionary
invention and based on the transmission of information.Mainframe
computers became a big business in the 1950s and wereconsidered a
mature industry by the late 1970s. But rapid increasesin microproces-
sor speeds, decreases in the cost ofproviding bandwidth, and the de-
velopment of the Internet have, in the last 25 years,fostered the
creation of many industries that have Schumpeteriandimensions.
These include computer software (e.g., operating systems,applica-
tions, and utilities), computer hardware (e.g., microprocessors, per-
sonal computers, and servers), and Internet-based businesses(e.g.,
portals, business-to-business exchanges, and contentproviders).1'
There are other industries, however, that have been born orrevolu-
tionized in the last quarter century and in which dynamic competition
is fundamental. These include communicationsnetworks (routers and
related equipment), mobile telephony, and biotechnology. Amuch
older industry pharmaceuticals, has some Schumpeterian characteris-
tics as well.12 Table 1.2 lists the leading industrial firms whoseexpendi-
tures on R&D accounted for more than 10%of their sales in 1997.'
More than one-quarter of these R&D-intensive companies were among
the 50 highest-valued companies at the end of2000.14 Most of these
would be characterized as high-technology or new-economy compa-
nies and have their fortunes tied to their success at innovation.
Key Characteristics
Industries in which dynamic competition for the market is important
have several of the following characteristics. Each characteristicreflects
a deviation from the textbook modelof static price/output competition
and has important implications for antitrust analysis.
Low Marginal Costs and High Fixed CostsFirms in new-economy in-
dustries tend to have high fixed costs and low marginalproduction
costs. They often must invest a great deal todevelop their products,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e8 Evans and Schmalensee
because they must invest in a physicalor virtual network to create and
deliver the product. But once they make this initialinvestment, it is
cheap to create additional units. It does not cost muchto produce an-
other copy of, say, the Adobe Acrobat Reader;nor, once a fabrication
facifity has been set up, to produce another Intel Pentiummicroproces-
sor. That is, production in new-economy industries exhibits increasing
returns.'5 For example, in 1998 materialexpenses accounted for 52% of
revenues in manufacturing industries overall,'6 while innew-economy
industries material expenses averaged less than 30% ofrevenues (for
example, software (19%),' pharmaceuticals (29%),18 andsemiconduc-
tor manufacturing (19%)').
Labor and Human Capital Intensity Manynew-economyindustries
make more intensive use of labor and less intensiveuse of tangible cap-
ital than old-economy industries. That is because the fixedcosts in-
curred by high-technology firms are mainly for the laborused to
develop their products, by developing intellectualproperty (or intangi-
ble capital). Thus, even if the subsequent productionprocess is fairly
capital-intensive, as in chip manufacturing for instance,new-economy
industries are generally relatively labor-intensive overall.Labor costs
are 15% of revenue in manufacturing industries overall as compared to
22% in electromedical equipment, 30% in software publishing,and
48% in computer programming services.20
Another important reason why labor compensationaccounts for a
high fraction of the costs in high-technology industriesis that they tend
to have more highly educated workforces than old-economyindus-
tries; accordingly they tend to use more human capital.2'For example,
the median education level of workers in the software industryis 15
years, while workers in all manufacturing have a median education
level of 12 years. Moreover, 15.6% of workers in thesoftware industry
have a graduate degree, as compared to 4.6% in allmanufacturing.22
Because intellectual property is the critical asset innew-economy in-
dustries, entry costs can be quite low, and the risk thata dangerous ri-
val will emerge seemingly from nowherecan be quite high. For
example, the Linux operating system, initially written bya graduate
student as a hobby and further developed by volunteersworking
through the open-source movementon the Internet, has captured a
24.4% share of new installations on servers.23 Anotheropen-source
product, Apache, has captureda 60% share of installations on Web
servers.24Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 9
Network and System Effects Many high-technology industries,particu-
larly those based on computer software, the Internet, ortelecommuni-
cations generally, have network effects. An industry isoften described
as a network industry if the valueof the network to any one consumer
depends importantly, either directly or indirectly, onthe number of
other consumers on the network.25 Such an industry may or maynot
involve an actual physical network. Commonly citedexamples of net-
work industries include telephones, fax machines, creditcard systems,
and e-mail. Many of these involve a physical network tolink consum-
ers,26 but the physical network is not really what makesthese network
industries in an economic sense. Some other networkindustries are
clearly virtual (not physical) networks, in which consumersbenefit in-
directly from the number of users of the network. In all cases,the use of
common standards plays a critical role inlinking network users. Net-
work effects are a source of scale economiesin consumptionrather
than productionand thus tend to produce marketswith at most a
small number of clear leaders, making it difficult forfirms with small
shares to survive unless they produce significantinnovation.
Many of the high-technology industries that haveemerged in the last
twenty years have significant network effects.Wintel computers (i.e.,
computers in which Windows software runs onIntel-compatible hard-
ware) are more valuable to each consumer the moreother consumers
use this standard. Softwaredevelopers will invest more in writing ap-
plications for this standard, making it more likelythat consumers will
have the applications they desire. Also, use of a commonstandard
makes it easier for consumers to exchange input and outputfiles (such
as data sets, text documents, orspreadsheets) with each other.
Many Internet-based businesses also have significantnetwork ef-
fects. That is perhaps most clearly true for messagingservices and chat
rooms, the value of whichdirectly increases with the number of people
on the same network. It isalso true for market-making services such as
eBay, where buyers benefit from there being moresellers, and sellers
benefit from there being more buyers.
Firms that are not leaders in network industries generallyhave little
hope of reaching that status unless they come up with amajor innova-
tionone that can defeat the natural advantage thatnetwork effects
bestow on the industry leaders. Incremental innovation(making slight
improvements in the leaders' products) will notenable a small firm to
overtake a leader that enjoys the benefits of network economies.Simi-
larly, the possibility of being displaced by a majorinnovation will10 Evans and Schmalensee
shape leaders' research agendas. If there isa chance that today's prod-
ucts will be replaced by a major innovation,a leader's survival de-
pends on bringing that innovation to market and therebyreplacing
itself before others do. As a result, competition in networkindustries
often involves intense R&D efforts aimed at capturingor retaining
market leadership.
System effectsin which the value ofone component of a system de-
pends on complementary components in the system27areimportant
in computer- and Internet-related high-technology industries.The
value of any software platform, suchas Windows or Java, depends
largely on the quality and quantity of applicationswritten to run on
that platform, as well as on the ability of available hardwareto run that
platform with both speed and reliability. Firms in high-technologyin-
dustries have strong incentives toencourage production of high-
quality complements. This welfare-enhancing activitygenerally re-
quires a good deal of interfirm communication of varioussorts.
Innovation as a Series of Winner-Take-All RacesCompetitioninsome
high-technology industries involvessequences of races to develop a
new product or, as discussed above, to replace an existing product
through drastic innovation. In the initialrace, firms invest heavily to
develop a product that creates anew category or becomes an early
leader in a new categorythe PaimPilot, VisiCorp's spreadsheetfor
the Apple, and AOL's Instant Messengerare examples. Winners get
large market shares and high profits fora while.28 Economic theorists
have produced numerous models ofraces of this sort, typically involv-
ing patents or network effects.29
In most of this literature, any given industry is assumedfor simplic-
ity to experience one and only one race, after which the winnerenjoys a
monopoly position forever.30 Unfortunately, this literatureseems to
have suggested to some observers that realnew-economy industries
also become stable monopolies afteran initial burst of dynamic compe-
tition. While it is true that network effects tend to reinforceleadership
positions, in many high-technology industries thereare multiple, se-
quential races for market leadership. Major innovationsoccur repeat-
edly, and switching costs and lock-in do notprevent displacement of
category leaders by better products. Figure 1.1 illustrates this phenom-
enon in the microcomputer software industry)' It is not atypical fora
fringe firm that invests heavily to displace the leader byleapfrogging
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Figure 1.1
Summary of category leaders for microcomputer software:shares in shipments
by leading firms. Source: Margolis and Liebowitz (1990); Evans,Nichols, and Reddy
(1999).
These winner-take-all races arise for two related reasonsdiscussed
above.32 First, network effects create a snowball effect(sometimes
called "positive feedback") for firms that are first tohave many
satisfied customers. When a firm attracts additional customers,the
value of its product increases, making it possible to attractstill more
consumers. Second, there are scaleeconomies at the firm level because
of high fixed intellectual property costs, so that making moresales en-
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charging low prices. In some high-technology industries, especially
those based on the Internet, network effects and scale economiesare so
pronounced that many firms give away their products for extendedpe-
riods of time, both to gain market penetration and to affect the evolu-
tion of technical standards. Netscape, for example, followed its famous
"free, but not free" approach to market penetration of its web
browser.33
Of course, in any particular industry in either thenew or the old
economy, there is no guarantee that competition through races for
drastic innovations wifi continue indefinitely. In the U.S. automobile
industry, an initial period of rapid innovation and product develop-
ment was followed by several decades of comparative stabffity One
might have described the auto industry in 1910 as Schumpeterian in
important respects; one would not have said this in 1950.
On the other hand, a period of stability in market positionsas mea-
sured by current sales can mask a fierce product developmentcontest.
Even though by 1990 Microsoft's MS-DOS had been far andaway the
leading PC operating system for almost a decade, Microsoftwas en-
gaged in a bet-the-company battle to develop a version of its Windows
operating system product that would prevail against IBM's OS/2. By
1990, DOS-type operating systems were generally viewedas obso-
letedeficient in handling memory, running multiple applications si-
multaneously, and providing ease of use. Microsoft had worked with
IBM in developing early versions of OS/2, an operating system de-
signed to overcome these deficiencies, but by the early 1990s thetwo
firms had gone their separate ways. In early 1992, IBM released the
first, widely praised version of OS/2 at about thesame time that Micro-
soft released Windows 3.1. Industry analysts at the time disagreed
in their predictions over which would bemore successful.35 A similar
pairing of hotly competing products appeared in late 1994 and
mid-1995, with the releases of OS/2 Warp 3.0 and Windows 9536
Again, analysts disagreed over which product would ultimately
prevail.37
Highly Profitable Industry LeadersFor firms to be willing to engage in
dynamic competition, they must expect toearn, on average, a competi-
tive rate of return on their R&D investments. These investmentsare
risky, for competitive as well as technologicalreasons. With some prob-
ability, a firm's R&D spending will produce no returns at all. For itsex-
pected rate of return to be competitive, it must be thecase that if theseSome Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 13
investments succeed, they at least temporarily produce enoughmarket
powerenough ability to charge prices that exceed the corresponding
marginal costs of productionto yield a supracompetitive rate of re-
turn viewed ex post.
Firms that expected that they would only be able to chargeprices
equal to marginal costs after completing their R&D successfullywould
obviously not invest in that R&D to begin with: they would not even
recover their fixed and sunk R&D costs.In dynamically competitive in-
dustries, entrepreneurs and their backers recognize that manywill try
and most wifi fail. In the aggregate, we expect that entrepreneursand
investors will keep investing until the expected rateof return, adjusted
for risk, is equal to what they can get elsewhere in the economy.But
these investments will fund many enterprises that do notsucceed (and
therefore lose money) and a few enterprises that do succeed(and there-
fore make a great deal of money). Expected and observed returns are
thus highly skewed.38
Similarly, because of network effects and scale economies, as well as
legally protected intellectual property, high-technology industries gen-
erally have a small number of relatively large firms at any pointin
time. In fact, in many new-economy industries these features may re-
sult in a single firm having the bulk of industry sales at anypoint in
time.
Dynamic vs. Static Competition in Antitrust Analysis
Just over a half century ago, Joseph Schumpeter describeddynamic
competition centered on drastic innovation as the "perennialgale of
creative destruction" that sweeps away the old economicorder and ar-
gued that it was the main source of economic progress.39He noted the
importance for consumer welfare of "competitionfrom the new com-
modity, the new technology.., competition which strikes not atthe
margins of the profits of the existing firms but at their foundationsand
their very lives."40 Andy Grove, the former CEO of Intel,summarized
business life for those in the path of these gales of creativedestruction:
"Only the paranoid survive."4'
In contrast, most economic texts and antitrustcasebooks treat perfect
competition as the welfare-maximizing market structure and treatde-
partures from this structure as problematic.42Of course, perfect compe-
tition is to economics what the frictionless plane is tophysics: an
abstract ideal that is never attained in reality. Moreimportantly, perfect14 Evans and Schmalensee
competition is an ideal only as regards static competition; nobodyar-
gues that it is an effective, let alone ideal, regime for producing innova-
tion through dynamic competition. Where dynamic competitionis
actually or potentially important as a source ofconsumer benefit, bas-
ing antitrust policy on the notion that perfect competition isan attain-
able ideal is unlikely to serve consumers well.
Nonetheless, antitrust analysis has historically taken departures
from textbook perfect competitionas signs of possible competitive
problems that may warrant government intervention.43 In assessing the
importance of those departures, antitrust analysis has traditionally
paid particular attention to whether any firms have high market
shares, since having a large number of relatively small firmsis a key
feature of perfect competition. However,as discussed just above, this
statically competitive market structure cannot persist inmany
new-economy industries. Similarly, leaders in many new-economy in-
dustries generally set prices well above marginal cost and enjoy high
rates of return even when dynamic competition is intense.
There are three important implications for antitrust economic analy-
sis. First, the rational expectation of significant marketpower for some
period of time is a necessary condition for dynamic competitionto exist
in high-technology industries. Thus if dynamic competition is healthy,
the presence of short-run market power is nota symptom of a market
failure that will harm consumers. Second,one expects leaders in
new-economy industries to charge prices well above marginal cost and
to earn high profits. It is natural in dynamic competition, notan indica-
tor of market failure, for successful firms to have high rates of return
even adjusting for risks they have borne. In effect, their lottery tickets
have paid off. Third, although static competition is rarely vigorousin
new-economy industries, the key determinant of the performance of
these industries is the vigor of dynamic competitionan issue thatis
ignored by traditional antitrust analysis. An explicit investigationof
present and likely future dynamic competition is essential to sound
economic analysis of Schumpeterian industries.
Some observers have contended that the complexity of high-
technology markets argues against the use of simple rules of antitrust
policy and in favor of widespread use of detailed rule-of-reason analy-
sis. On the other hand, such analysis tends to be time-consuming, and
the high rate of technological progress in these sectors and the fragility
of market positions based on intangible assetsmean that analyses of
new-economy industries require access to specialized technical knowl-Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 15
edge and rapidly become dated. Based on these concerns, Judge Rich-
ard Posner (2000) has noted his doubts that government officials can
access the technical information necessaryfor sound analysis and that
the judicial system can process new-economy antitrust casesbefore
they are overtaken by events. The only apparent approach to themiti-
gation of these problems is to develop presumptions and structured
rules of reason that reflect new-economy realities and that are designed
to lighten the courts' analytical burden. Whenthe world is changing
rapidly, an approximate analysis of today's conditions is much more
likely to be useful than an exact analysis of conditions a decade ago.
III.Market Definition and Market Power
The Market Share Approach
Many business practices are suspect under the antitrust laws onlyif the
firms engaging in them have significant market power.45 Business prac-
tices such as tying the sale of two or more products, entering intoexclu-
sive distribution contracts, selling products below cost, acquiringother
firms, and engaging in price discrimination are not questioned for
firms without market power. But for firms with market power,these
same practices are either per seillegal under the antitrust laws (e.g., ty-
ing under some conditions) regardless of their economiceffects, or sub-
ject to a more extensive rule-of-reason inquiry (e.g., sellingproducts
below cost) into economic effects. The inquiry into market power is
therefore central to many antitrust cases.46
Professional economists approaching the issue of market power in
an industry in which static competitionis the norm would ordinarily
inquire into the existence of substitutes on the demand andsupply
sides and examine the extent to which these substitutes constrain the
pricing ability of the firm or firms in question. They would also exam-
ine barriers to the entry of new suppliers and analyze the relationship
between the prices being charged by the firms under considerationand
their costs of production.
The courts and the enforcement agencies, however, have become
fixated on market shares, and this has shaped the typical approach to
market power analysis. This approach involves: (1) defining "the rele-
vant market" in which the firms operatewithproducts and regions
necessarily either 100% in or 100% out of the market; (2) calculating the
share of the market thus defined for the firm or firms in question;and16 Evans and Schmalensee
(3) inferring significant market power mainly from whether the share is
high (60% is a favorite threshold for the courts). Even in old-economy
industries in which production capacity is often important and market
share tends to follow capacity. there is no rigorous defense for strictre-
liance on this approach to measuring market power.47 Elasticities of de-
mand and supply fall along a continuum, as do cross-price elasticities
of demand and supply. Thus there is no basis in economics for drawing
hard market boundaries or for treating all productsas either all in or all
out of the market.48 Even if market definition is not a problem,a firm's
ability to affect price generally depends onmore than its share of cur-
rent sales, as the courts have from time to time recognized.49
The market-definitionmarket-share approach to the analysis of
market power is considerably more problematic fornew-economy in-
dustries. In the new economy, today's sales and market share tendto be
driven by the quality of today's products, perhaps amplified bynet-
work effects, not by durable assets like production capacity and distri-
bution systems. Today's sales do not necessarilysay anything about the
value of intellectual capital, the qualityor popularity of tomorrow's
products, or the changing nature of the markets in which they will
compete. Market positions based on intellectual property are fragile
when innovation is rapid. There is an even more basic difficulty: lead-
ers in high-technology industries must have (temporary) market
power if there is to be dynamic competition that enhances consumer
welfare. And, of course, the purpose of market definition and market
power analysis is to learn to what extent competitive forces constrain
the ability of a firm or set of firms to engage in actions that will harm
consumers.5°
Defining Markets in New-Economy Industries
Traditional market definition analysis, which studies constraintson
firms' price/output decisions, can presenta seriously misleading pic-
ture of competitive relations in the new economy. Successful incum-
bents in Schumpeterian industries are constrained primarily by
dynamic competition: by the threat that another firm willcome up with
a drastic innovation that causes demand for the incumbent's product to
collapse. The new product may be just a vastly better version of the old
product (the Palm Pilot vs. the Apple Newton),or it may be an entirely
different product that eliminates the demand for the old product (the
hand-held calculator vs. the slide rule).5' These threats forcenew-Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 17
economy firms to investheavily in R&D and to bring out new versions
of their productsincluding versions thatlead to the demise of their
old versions. (For instance, Windows 95largelythough not in-
stantlyeliminated the demand for MS-DOS.) Thesethreats also gen-
erally constrain the prices charged byincumbents: the higher the
current prices and the smaller thenetwork of users, the more attractive
an entrant will be to consumersevenif incumbents lower prices in re-
sponse to entry.52
The recent history of high-technology industriesdemonstrates that
dynamic competition takes place amongfirms that are not necessarily
competitors in the static markets that economistsordinarily define for
antitrust cases. Dynamic competition hasbeen particularly evident in
the software industry. In some instancesfirms race to create an entirely
new product category. Forexample, VisiCalc defined the category of
spreadsheet software and was the early marketleader. But it was even-
tually displaced, first by Lotus 1-2-3 andsubsequently by Microsoft Ex-
cel. In other instances, dynamic competitiontakes the form of
innovation to displace a category leader.For example, Micropro's
WordStar was the early leader in word processingsoftware for PCs,
which significantly displaced dedicated wordprocessing systems such
as those offered by Wang.But WordStar was eventually displacedby
WordPerfect. WordPerfect retained categoryleadership for approxi-
mately six years before being displaced byMicrosoft Word, which was
helped in part by the transition to graphical userinterfaces and, in par-
ticular, Windows.53
This pattern is not unique to computersoftware. It can also be ob-
served in other industries such aspharmaceuticals and handheld de-
vices. For example, in 1977, SmithKline-Beechamoffered the first
H2-antagonist antiulcer drug, called Tagamet.54When GlaxoWeilcome
entered the market in 1983 with Zantac, itquickly took market share
from Tagamet. Merck (Pepcid) and EliLffly (Axid) also entered the
market eventually. By 1988, Zantac surpassed themarket share of the
first mover, Tagamet. By 1993, Zantac had 55%of the market, Tagamet
had 21%, Pepcid had 15%, and Axid had 9%.
The race to develop operating systems forpersonal digital assistants
(PDAs) is another example of dynamiccompetition. Apple introduced
the first handheld PDA, called the Newton,in 1993, but that product
was not a success withconsumers.55 Following the failure of the New-
ton, a number of firms began developingoperating system software for
PDAs. In 1996, there were at least six firmswith operating systems for18 Evans and Schmalensee
these handheld devices either available toconsumers or in develop-
ment.56 By 1998, the Palm OS was the clear leader in the PDAsegment
with a 73% share.57 Palm remains the category leadertoday, but its
leadership faces threats from Microsoft's WindowsCE operating sys-
tem and Symbian's operating system, among others.58
In new-economy industries,an essential element of market power
analysis is an examination of actual and potential innovativethreats to
leading firms.59 This cannot be a simple exercise in drawingboundaries
and computing shares or even looking at traditional barriersto entry,
which concern noninnovative entry. It generally involvesthe exercise
of judgment regarding the likelihood of futureraces for market domi-
nance and the likely nature of those races. There is no guarantee that
such races will continue in anynew-economy industry but neither
does the absence of a visible race atany particular point in time (e.g.,
after WordPerfect attained clear leadership in wordprocessing) imply
that dynamic competition is atan end. Examination of innovative
threats also generally involves consideration ofcompetitive threats
based on technologies and design approaches that differradically from
those used by the incumbent. A useful examination ofWang's position
in word processing in the early 1980s, for instance, would havebeen se-
riously misleading if it had not at least considered theemerging threat
posed by personal computers.6°
The Relevance of Market Power in New-EconomyIndustries
Static market power, usually measured by market share,has been used
by the courts as a screen to enable themto avoid inquiring into anti-
trust claims when consumer harm is implausible andto focus scarce ju-
dicial resources on those situations in whichmarket forces may not
provide sufficient discipline.61 But static marketpower, even if mea-
sured accurately by market share, is nota useful antitrust concept in
high-technology industries, for two relatedreasons.
First, market share tests do not providea useful screen in new-econ-
omy industries, since most leading firms have marketpower in the
static sense. Thus a consistent application of this approachwould im-
ply that their business practices would always be subjectto full-blown
rule-of-reason inquiries. Indeed, inmany high-technology industries a
single firm has a high share of whatevercategory it serves; this cate-
gory is a market under the approaches ordinarily used by the enforce-
ment agencies in antitrust inquires.62 For example, table 1.3reviews theSome Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 19
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Note: Based upon plausibly defined markets. GlaxoSmithKline's 77% and 65% shares
are specifically for the markets of the chemicals Ceftazidime and Triptan.
Sources: In re America Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., No. C-3989, Complaint,
December 14, 2000, 8; "Building John Chambers' New World Network," Business Week
Online, September 13, 1999, available at <http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_37/
b3646003.htm>; Adam Cohen, "eBay's Bid to Conquer All," Time.com, February 5, 2001,
availableat<http:/ /www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,917l,97O68,00.html>;
Complaint, In re Glaxo Weilcome plc and SmithKline Beecham plc, No. C-3990;
"Intel Faces Threats From Rivals as the Microprocessor Giant's Highly Touted Itanium
Chip Launch isDelayed," PR Newswire, January 2,2001;"Client Operating
Environments,MarketForecastand Analysis,2000-2004,"InternationalData
Corporation, Report 22346 (June 2000, Table 4); "Market Mayhem: Smart Handheld
Devices Market Forecast and Analysis, 1999-2004," International Data Corporation,
Report 22430 (June 2000, Table 47); "Pocketful of PCs?" International Data Corporation,
Report 22184 (May 2000, Table 1); "Gartner's Dataquest Says Oracle is No. 1 Database
Software Leader in the World, Three Years Running," Oracle Press Release, May 4, 2000,
available at <http:/ /www.oracle.com/corporate/press/index.html?198762.html>; "FTC
Order Clears Way for $90 Billion Merger of Pfizer, Inc. and Warner Lambert Company",
FTC press release, June 19, 2000; "Worldwide Workstation Census, Forecast and
Analysis, 1999-2004," International Data Corporation, Report 22183 (May 2000, Table 1)
(based on shipments, Sun's worldwide share is 57%; excludes branded personal
workstations).
shares of leading high-technology companies in categories that plain-
tiffs could plausibly identify as markets in antitrust cases. Given the
historical fragility of market leadership positions in new-economy in-
dustries, there is no economic basis for treating leading firms in these
industries as if they had the sort of durable market position that would
be associated with, for instance, large shares of steel-making or
oil-refining capacity.
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The second, related problem with reliance on market share in
new-economy industries is that static market power does not provide a
useful measure of the constraints that market forces place on efforts by
a firm to take anticompetitive actionsthose that will tend to reduce
consumer welfare. In most traditional businesses, firms are primarily
constrained by their direct competitors in the market. In some cases,
potential competitors are also an important constraint because it is easy
to enter the business, produce comparable products, and compete ef-
fectively. R&D efforts are comparatively modest, and innovation is
likely to result in incremental change, not "creative destruction." In
many new-economy industries, on the other hand, leading firms are
constrained mainly by rivalsknown and unknownthat are invest-
ing or easily could invest in drastic innovations. They are not con-
strained much by the pricing or production decisions of existing firms,
because they typically face few if any contemporaneous rivals, and
scale economies and network effects are often effective barriers to the
entry of comparable (or "me-too") products.
As a result, a proper market-power inquiry in new-economy indus-
tries must include a serious analysis of the vigor of dynamic competi-
tion. This requires looking beyond current sales figures. It is important,
for instance, to examine ownership of and investment in relevant intel-
lectual propertywhich may involve technologies not currently in
commercial use. If, for instance, the current market leader owns all in-
tellectual property necessary for radical innovation, dynamic competi-
tion will not be effective. Similarly, foreclosing rivals from important
distribution channels is likely to restrain dynamic as well as static com-
petition.63 If, on the other hand, several firms are making significant
R&D investments in order to obtain or retain leadership positions, and
if knowledgeable observers consider the outcome of the struggle to be
in doubt, dynamic competition is likely to be healthy regardless of cur-
rent market shares.
Similarly, the abffity of new firms to enter into dynamic competition
can impose significant constraints on the behavior of current market
leaders. In sectors where capital requirements are small and the sup-
ply of skilled labor is deepsoftware and Silicon Valley come to
mindthis constraint is likely to be particularly important. In other
sectors, intellectual property positions or capital requirements may rob
potential entrants into dynamic competition of any competitive force.
At base, these are empirical questions that cannot be reliably answered
by formulaic analysis.Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 21
Market Definition, Market Power, and the Microsoft Case
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the government claimed that Micro-
soft tried to prevent Netscape and Sun from producing software that
could evolve into competition for Microsoft Windows. Microsoft alleg-
edly invested in harming these potentially competitive products
through a predatory campaign involving hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of direct costs and forgone revenues. In order to see whether
Microsoft's conduct was likely to harm consumers on balancethe key
economic question in most antitrust analysisit would be necessary to
consider the extent to which Microsoft faced Schumpeterian competi-
tion from Netscape, Sun, and other firms with new technologies. It
would also be necessary to examine whether Microsoft could have
plausibly believed that eliminating Netscape and Sun as threats would
free it from competition long enough to permit it to recoup an invest-
ment in predation.64
The government, following antitrust tradition, focused on static mar-
ket power, using a market share approach based on theHorizontal
Merger Guidelines. It defined a market for operating systemsfor
Intel-compatible personal computers and found no current competi-
tors able to prevent Microsoft from charging morethan "the competi-
tive price."65 The government also stressed Microsoft's persistently
high share of this "market," the importance of network effectsthat
would make it hard for equivalent competing operating systems to en-
ter, and the fact that Microsoft charged different computermanufactur-
ers slightly different prices forWindows. There was in fact no
controversy between the government and Microsoft overwhether
Microsoft had static market power and, like any successful software
firm, the ability to set price well above marginal cost.66 Microsoft ar-
gued that network effects in general offer no protection against dra-
matic innovations, which have occurred frequently in personal
computer software, and that because price discrimination is common
in both the old and new economies, it says little about the presenceof
substantial market power.
Unfortunately, this focus on static market power prevented a serious
discussion of the role of dynamic competition. The government's mar-
ket definition excluded the competitive threatsNetscape's Navigator
and Sun's Javathat allegedly led Microsoft to engage in predation,
because they were not operating systems for Intel-compatible comput-
ers. For the analysis of static competition,this was the right answer,22 Evans and Schmalensee
since they were in fact not competing head to head with Windowsas
operating systems. For the more relevant analysis of dynamic competi-
tion, this definition was not useful, since both Navigator and Javawere
viewed by all the parties involved as having the potential not justto
take some business away from Windows at the margin but to replace it
swiftly as the leading software platformin Marc Andreessen'smem-
orable phrase, to reduce Windows to "a mundane collection ofnot en-
tirely debugged device drivers." 67
We are not contending that it was obvious that Microsoftwas con-
strained by the forces of dynamic competition. The analysis of dynamic
competition is rarely simple, and one can legitimately debate how vul-
nerable Windows' market position was to drastic innovation. Rather,
our point is that the government and its economists did not engage in
that critical empirical debate. The district court, following old-
economy precedents, agreed that static market power was sufficient for
a finding of monopoly.68
If antitrust is to benefit consumers, in litigation involving industries
in which competition has centered on investment in intellectualprop-
erty both sides should be able to stipulate that the firms have static
market power. It should be understood that if dynamic competition is
healthy, static market power is largely irrelevant for thepurpose for
which market power is considered in most antitrust cases, particularly
those involving charges of monopolization: it does not providean ef-
fective screen, and it does not summarize the relevant behavioralcon-
straints. Thus, antitrust litigants dealing with the neweconomy should
be obliged to offer and defend logically consistent descriptions of
the current and likely future health of dynamic competition. A
Schumpeterian past does not guarantee a Schumpeterian future, but it
does provide relevant information.
IV.Predation
Legal Standards for Predation
Until the early 1980s predatory pricing cases were often a defendant's
nightmare. In such cases, defendants are charged with maintaining
monopoly (or market dominance) by lowering price temporarily to
prevent the entry or force the exit of a troublesome rival or set of rivals.
It is generally irrational not to cut price in the face ofnew competition,
but price cuts large enough to be effective might open the door to law-Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 23
suits. Lacking economic standards, judges and juries came torely on
evidence of injury and intent to determine whether or not price cuts
were predatory. Thus a large firm's pricecut that harmed a smaller ri-
val, even a rival with much higher costs, might be foundillegal, partic-
ularly if some salesman had written a memo about"crushing those
upstarts" or something of the sort.
Areeda and Turner (1975) noted that the then existing state ofpreda-
tory pricing law served to harm consumersby discouraging competi-
tive price reductions. They suggested using therelationship between
price and average variable cost as a screen for predation.When firms
charge prices below this level they are losing money,and predation is a
possible explanation for this behavior. Under their test,firms can safely
lower price in response to competition as long as priceremains above
average variable cost.69 This provides firmswith a safe harbor within
which they can engage in procompetitive price cutting.
Easterbrook (1981) took a different but complementary approach.He
argued that predatory strategies were seldom likely to beprofitable
because of the difficulty of recouping the costs of eliminatingcompeti-
tion, and that such strategies were thereforeseldom tried. Thus, he
contended, the application of cost-based predation tests waslikely to
harm consumers by deterring price-cutting while, sincepredation
is rare, yielding few benefits. The Supreme Courtreflected these con-
cerns in its key modern decisions onthis issue: Matsushita and Brooke
Group.7°
The Court in Matsushita noted that predatory pricing isequivalent to
an investment. For that investment tobe rational, the firm or firms that
engage in predatory pricing must expect tomaintain monopoly power
long enough to more than recoup the losses from the predatorypricing
campaign.71 The Court recognized, "For this reason, there is a consen-
sus among commentators thatpredatory pricing schemes are rarely
tried, and even more rarely successful."72 The Court concludedthat in
the case at hand, "The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve itsends in
the two decades of its asserted operation is strongevidence that the
conspiracy does not in fact exist."73 Finally, the Courtexpressed great
concern that false inferences ofpredation would "chifi the very con-
duct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."74
In Brooke Group, the Court required that plaintiffsestablish that be-
low-cost pricing had occurred and that the defendanthad a reasonable
expectation of recouping its predatory loses through future pricein-
creases. The Court's rationale for the recoupmenttest was that, even if24 Evans and Schmalensee
below-cost pricing by a firm may hurtsome of its rivals, if it is unable
to recoup its losses, then aggregate market prices are lower,consumer
welfare is enhanced, and the apparently predatory pricingscheme
should not be condemned.75 In other words,even if there is harm to
competitors, a court must be able to find harm to competitionand
thus, ultimately, to consumersin order to findan antitrust violation.76
The Brooke Group's recoupment test thereby sharply limited thesitua-
tions in which defendants could be found guilty of predation when
there was no prospect of harm to consumers.77
Predation in New-Economy Industries
The application of available predation tests tonew-economy busi-
nesses is problematic in several respects. On the one hand, safe harbors
based on variable costs providenew-economy firms with wide latitude
for dropping prices for predatory or otherreasons, since variable costs
are often far below observed prices. On the other hand, penetration
pricing, at or below variable cost, is common inmany new-economy
industries as a result of network effects. Software products, inparticu-
lar, are often given away to build usage, increase demand forcomple-
mentary products, and affect standards by firms that plainly lack
monopoly power. Thus lowor even negativepricesmay be rational
and, so long as there is sufficient competition for the market,may be ul-
timately procompetitive.
The most fundamental problemswhich involve definitionas well
as measurementarise under winner-take-all competition. Suppose
two firms, an incumbent (M) and an entrant (E),are engaged in a race
to develop and attract lead users for the next-generation widget. And
suppose, for simplicity, that whichever firm wins the race will havea
permanent widget monopoly. It is clear that M might be able touse its
position in the market to tilt this Schumpeterianrace in its favorby
locking up all widget distribution channels in advance, forinstance. It
is equally clear that such practices, if they have substantialanti-
competitive effects, are and should be ifiegal. But,as a logical matter,
what sorts of behavior by M in the ongoingrace should be condemned
as predatory? And what practical test will detect such behavior with-
out unduly discouraging proconsumer competition?
Cost-based tests do not help in this context. How much woulda
nonpredatory M be willing to spend on product development andat-Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 25
traction of lead users to win the race with E? If spending more guaran-
teed a win, M would be willing to spend up to the present value of the
monopoly profits it would enjoy if it were to win. It would spend less if
spending less would guarantee a win, but it would be better off walk-
ing away from the widget business than spending more. Of course, in
the real world, it is uncertain who wifi win; monopolies do not last for-
ever, and future profits can at best be roughlyestimated. But the key
point is that the maximum amount M would be willing to spend does
not depend on whether it thinks predatory thoughts about E or not: an
evil predator would not rationally spend more than the present value
of future profits any more than a clean-thinking competitor. Thus, in
principle as well as in practice, there is no cost-based test to distinguish
predatory innovation (product development and marketing) from
nonpredatory innovation in a winner-take-all setting. Indeed, there is
no logical difference between the two.
Neither does the Brooke Group recoupment test help under winner-
take-all competition.78 Each firm in a winner-take-all race is likely to
charge low prices, possibly even below variable cost, in the expectation
that it will recoup its losses by raising prices once it wins the race. But it
does not make any sense to define the predator as whoever wins the
race. Moreover, consumers benefit from this sortof rivalry because
firms enter the race and invest in losses early on.
Placing greater weight on evidence of intent, as in the days before
Areeda and Turner (1975), would add heat, not light. In a winner-
take-all race, the only alternative to failure is to destroy the competition
and make money thereafter. Thus internal memos that brag about
"keeping E out of the market" have exactly the same meaning as
widely distributed press releases that brag about "providing a better
widget than E and doing it faster."
Finally, the natural place to turn for an analysis of predation in dy-
namic competition is the discussion of "predatory innovation" by
Ordover and Willig (1981). Under their proposed standard, the only
such proposal in the scholarly literature of which we are aware, "the
relevant question is whether the innovator anticipated positive incre-
mental profit for the new product, given the continued viability of the
rival."79 Unfortunately, this standard is generally unworkable. Key
quantities, such as the expected future profit stream over time, are not
observable, firms may invest in important new technologies without
having detailed revenue forecasts, and the details of capital budgeting26 Evans and Schmalensee
documents may not reflect top management consensus. We suspect its
impracticality is one reason the Ordover-Wihig test has not been em-
braced by the courts or by antitrust practitioners.
Moreover, under winner-take-all competition, the Ordover-Willig
test has the same fundamental problem that robs cost-based and re-
coupment tests of any power: there is no nonexciusion standard of
comparison that makes logical sense in a winner-take-all setting. If M
wins the race to attract lead users, it obtains a monopoly and excludes
E; if it loses, it is out of the business, and its R&D costs are money down
a rathole. Success, exclusion, and monopolization are one and the
same.
Thus, under winner-take-all competition we not only lack useful
tools for detecting predatory behavior, we do not have a good
definition of such behavior. There would seem to be two possibleways
for antitrust policy to respond while this remains true. First, judges
could be instructed to engage in a full factual inquiry and to condemn
as predatory dynamic competition that they find unreasonably intense
or motivated by evil intentsomething like Justice Stewart's approach
to obscenity.8° The danger is that in the absence of clear standards, com-
petition will be generally discouraged as firms try to limit antitrust
risks, and consumers wifi be harmed. Second, judges could be in-
structed that if a defendant can establish that the relevant market is
characterized by winner-take-all competition then they have provided
a complete defense against a charge of predatory behaviorand not,
we hasten to add, against other possible antitrust charges. In light of
the extraordinarily high costs of discouraging dynamic competition
broadly, the second approach seems likely to produce a higher level of
consumer welfare.
Predation in the Microsoft Case
Our primary focus here is not on the facts of the case, but ratheron the
test proposed by the government and ultimately adopted by the dis-
trict court to support its finding of predation. Professor Franklin Fisher,
testifying for the government, argued that a business action is preda-
tory if it is profit-maximizing only because it creates market power by
harming competition. There is no requirement under this test that
losses be incurred or that price be below any measure of cost; the stan-
dard of comparison is not cost but maximum profit.8' The government
offered no explicit analysis of either profitability or recoupment,as theSome Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 27
Brooke Group standard would have required.82 The district court's
finding of liability seemed to rest primarily on evidence that Microsoft
spent money in the short run to compete with Netscape (and, to a
lesser extent, Sun) and that internal e-mails described these actions as
aimed at producing victory in winner-take-all competition.83
The first problem with this test is that it cannot be applied rigorously
in practice. While one can, with some effort, compare revenues and
costs quantitatively, a similar comparison of actual with maximum
profits, particularly as both evolve over time under complex uncer-
tainty, is plainly beyond the ability of economists and courts.
Second, we agree with Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff: "[Tihe
definition used by the government's economic witness of an anti-
competitive act as one that isn't profit-maximizing absent the returns
from increased monopoly profits is too stringent. If applied literally,
it would prevent behavior that benefits consumers."84 Even in old-
economy industries, Fisher's test could be used to attack above- cost
pricing that had the effect of excluding less efficient entrants.85 Most
businesses routinely invest in creating intellectual property, advertis-
ing, product differentiation, and other efforts. They do this because
they expect to obtain market powerthat is the only way they can be
compensated for their efforts. And, particularly in new-economy in-
dustries with Schumpeterian competition, that market power fre-
quently comes at the expense of existing or potential rivals. To prevent
this behavior would plainly lower consumer welfare.
The Brooke Group test would not have been more illuminating. To see
this, consider the world that would have existed if Microsoft had never
developed a browser or competed with Netscape. Before introducing
its Navigator browser in 1994, Netscape invested in creating a product
that was better than the handful of existing browsers.86 It also invested
in achieving "ubiquity." In Marc Andreessen's words:
The key to success for the whole thing was getting ubiquity on the [browser]
side. ... If you getubiquity you have a lot of options. ... You can getpaid by
the product that you are ubiquitous on, but you can also get paid on products
that benefit as a result. One of the fundamental lessons is that market share
now equals revenue later, and if you don't have market share now, you are not
going to have revenue later. Another fundamental lesson is that whoever gets
the volume does win in the end. Just plain wins.87
This would seem to be a predatory strategy under the test proposed
by the government and accepted by the district court.88 Netscape's
strategy would be profitable only if it eliminated its rivals and thereby28 Evans and Schmalensee
achieved dominance. This would also seem to be a predatory strategy,
however, under the Brooke Group test: Netscape spent resources to dis-
tribute its browser for free (thus arguably selling below cost). It ex-
pected to make these losses back by using its "ubiquity" to sell
complementary products for Web servers and later to receive revenues
from its Internet portal site. Obviously, it could recoup its losses on the
browser only if its "ubiquity" gave it market power over these comple-
mentary products.
V.Tying
Current State of Tying Law
Tying occurs when a firm makes the sale of one product conditional
on the sale of a second product: generally, in order to purchase product
A (the "tying" product), a buyer must also purchase product B
(the "tied" product) from the same seller. The courts have considered
tying by a firm that has market power over the tying product to be a
per se violation of the antitrust laws (at least under some condi-
tions) since the International Salt decision in 1947.89 That is, the courts
wifi not ordinarily entertain arguments (which would be legitimate in
a rule-of-reason analysis) that tying results in consumer benefits
in general or in the case at hand. As one court said in 1949, "tying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of com-
petition."90
Economists have long argued that the law's hostffity to this practice
does not serve consumers well.91 While tying can be anticompetitive
under certain conditions, there is no theoretical or empirical basis for a
judgment that it is always or often harmful, even when done by firms
that have market power.92 Firms without substantial market power
routinely ticor, equivalently, bundle or integrateproducts that
could in principle be sold separately.93 Such firms must do this for
efficiency-based reasons: because it reduces their costs, increases their
demand, lowers transactions costs, or reduces heterogeneity in con-
sumers' wfflingness to pay,94 thus increasing profits. Although econo-
mists have identified circumstances under which tying could harm
consumers on balance (as we discuss below), the court's tying prohibi-
tions do not focus on these circumstances.95
In the last twenty years, jurists have increasingly recognized that the
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her concurring opinion in the 1984 Jefferson Parish decision, for in-
stance, Justice O'Connor wrote, "Unless it is to beifiegal to sell cars
with engines or cameras with lenses, this analysis [of what ties are ifie-
gal] must be guided by some limiting principle."96Unfortunately Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the majority, declined to take issue withthe
fundamental problem: "It is far too late in the history of our antitrust
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrange-
ments pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competitionand therefore
are unreasonable 'per se."97
Ultimately, the Jefferson Parish decision was a largely unsuccessful at-
tempt to put tying law on a sound footing. The majorityenunciated a
four-part test: (1) Is a substantial volume of commerce affected?98 (2)
Do two distinguishable product markets exist (based on distinctde-
mands for two separate products)?99 (3) Does the defendant have mar-
ket power in the tying product market?10° (4) Does the arrangement
involve the use of market power to force consumers to buy a product
or service that they would not otherwisepurchase?101 As the Jefferson
Parish test has been interpreted, it condemns many ties to which there
are no sound economic objections, and itfails to focus on those specific
circumstances in which economists have identified possible anti-
competitive effects from tying.
Lower courts have carved out an important exception to this test for
"technological ties." The Fifth Circuit Court in Leasco held that findings
of tying violations "must be limited to those instances where thetech-
nological factor tying the hardware to the software has been designed
for the purpose of tying the products, rather than to achieve some tech-
nologically beneficial result."102 To do otherwise, it held, would "en-
mesh the courts in a technical inquiry into the justifiability of product
innovations."03 Since Leasco, a number of other technological tying
cases have established the courts' reluctance tointervene in product in-
tegration decisions.104 The Second Circuit Court in Foremost, for in-
stance, held explicitlythat the perseruleisinapplicable to
technological ties.105 Areeda, Elhauge, and Hovenkamp argue that
these precedents are consistent with a policy of questioning thetechno-
logical merit of a tie only where there is: (1) genuine threat to the health
of the allegedly tied complementary market; (2) substantial power in
the allegedly tying primary market; (3) incompatibility between the re-
designed product and the rival complementary products, and (4) no
genuine dispute that the primary product design change lacks any
technological benefit.'°630 Evans and Schmalensee
Tying, Bundling and Integration in New-Economy Industries
The dynamic competitive process in new-economy industries often in-
volves combining features and services that were previously available
separately to create products that are differentiated from existing offer-
ings. Such product integration can benefit consumers substantially
even as it destroys markets for previously separate products.
Product integration has been a major force in the PC software indus-
try over the last 20 years. Word processing software in the early 1980s,
for instance, included neither spelling checkersnor grammar checkers.
Standalone products to perform each task were developed and sold:
Borland's Turbo Lightning was a spelling checker,'°7 and Reference
Software's Grammatik was a grammar checker.108 By the late 1980s, the
leading word processing programs all included spelling checkers;109 by
the early 1990s, they all included grammar checkersas well."° The
market for the standalone products has now almost entirely disap-
peared.111 Similarly, modern spreadsheets, like Excel, QuattroPro, and
1-2-3, include graphing and optimization functionality thatwas for-
merly sold separately.
Integration is common in PC hardware as well, as mathcoprocessors
illustrate.'12Intel's16-bit and early 32-bit x86 microprocessors
(8088/8086, 80286 and 80386 families) could perform integer butnot
floating point arithmetic. Floating point arithmetic could be done
slowly in software or rapidly with separate mathcoprocessors sold by
Intel and others; software developers had to write different versions of
their products for computers with and withoutcoprocessors. Intel's
80486 microprocessor (introduced in 1989) finally included both inte-
ger and floating point operations, though its 80486SX was essentially
an 80486 without floating point capabilities.113 All of Intel's newer x86
microprocessors, starting with the Pentium in 1993, have included
floating point operations. The demand for separate mathcoprocessors
to work with x86 microprocessors has, accordingly, been completely
eliminated.
Current examples of attempted integration include PDAs, suchas
those based on the Palm and Windows CE operating systems. Both of
these operating systems have added (or soon will add) the capability
with suitable hardware, to play music files in the MP3 format.'14 This
integration may substantially reduce the demand for portable MP3
players. Another current area of integration involves PDAs and mobile
phones.'15Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 31
Product integration is, of course, not limited to the computerand
consumer electronics industries. Take,for example, blood analyzers:
Nova Biomedical, which has the largest share of sales ofblood-gas ana-
lyzers to the point-of-care segment (e.g., emergency rooms),recently
introduced its latest contribution to biotechnology, the BioProfile. The
BioProfile analyzer incorporates eleven tests. The company advertises
that "a single BioProfile analyzer replaces five or moreanalyzers and
testing protocols, resulting in significant capital and labor
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Product integration of this sort is generally suspect under astrict
reading of Jefferson Parish. The traditional, staticapproach to market
analysis would typically find that the leading firm in mosthigh-
technology industries has market powerbased mainly on having a
high share of a narrowly defined product market. Consequently, as
suggested by table 1.3, most leading high-technology firmswould fail
the market-power screen in the Jefferson Parish test. If the leadingfirm,
by product integration, "tied" the sale of another productfor which
there is currently separate demand to a product overwhich it would be
found to have market power, it would fail the remaining prongs ofthe
Jefferson Parish test.
In light of the ubiquity of competition and innovation via productin-
tegration in new-economy industries, it may be reassuringthat the
technology-tying exception to Jefferson Parish seems to providebroad
protection for this form of proconsumer behavior. Butthe Supreme
Court has not spoken on this issue, and the Microsoft caseillustrates
what could happen in many new-economy industries if theSupreme
Court were to weaken or remove the technology-tying exception.
Tying in the Microsoft Case
As the rapid rise of the Internet became apparent,IBM announced in
the fall of 1994 that it would include its web browser(Web Explorer) in
OS/2, and it did so in early 1995, more than six monthsbefore Win-
dows 95 came out. Other vendorsincluding Apple (CyberDog) and
Sun (HotJava)also developed web browsers to includewith their op-
erating systems. Microsoft, which was widelycriticized for being slow
to see the importance of the Internet,"7decided to include browsing
software (later called Internet Explorer (IE)) in Windows 95, which was
released in August 1995. Over the next several releases of IE,Microsoft
integrated IE's browsing features and services more tightly into Win-
dows and made them available to applications programs."8All major32 Evans and Schmalensee
operating systems currently include a web browser "atno extra
charge."119 As far as we have been able to verify,no vendor (except
Microsoft) has ever offered separate versions ofan operating system,
with and without a web
The Justice Department claimed in U.S.v. Microsoft that Microsoft's
inclusion of IE in Windows was a per se ifiegal tie, and the districtcourt
agreed. The district court mentioned the technological tyingcases and
acknowledged the danger that a court could "improvidently windup
condemning 'integrations' that represent genuine improvementsto
software that are benign from the standpoint ofconsumer welfare and
a competitive market."21 However, the district court concluded that it
was bound by Jefferson Parish. Despite the DC Circuit's decision ina re-
lated case that the inclusion of JE in Windows involved technological
integration,'22 the district court also found that itwas "not at liberty to
extrapolate a new rule governing the tying of software products."123
The district court's application of the Jefferson Parish testwas beset
with some problems that the test has in all industrieswhether
high-technology or not. As mentioned above, that test doesnot meas-
ure consumer benefits and costs or embody any theory of how tying
could harm consumers. It thus cannot indicate whetherany challenged
tie is likely to reduce consumer welfare.
At least as interpreted by the district court, the Jefferson Parishtest
did not require examination of the demand fora version of Windows
without a browser, though such an examination isnecessary for any
analysis of the effect of the tie on competitionor consumer welfare.'24
In fact, as noted above, as a result of the district court's injunctionin a
related matter,'25 Microsoft had licenseda version of Windows 95 that
had IF disabled. Only one OEM, Packard Bell/NEC, chose thatver-
sion, and only for two of its laptop computer lines.'26
The district court's analysis also exemplifies the problemsof using
Jefferson Parish to evaluate product design in high-technologyindus-
tries. As discussed above, dynamic competition in these industriesin-
volves the steady accretion of features and services in products.Much
of the past 25 years of innovation in these industries could be foundil-
legal under the Jefferson Parish test as applied by the districtcourt.
Many new-economy firms have static marketpower and have inte-
grated features or services previously soldas separate products. Just as
one could not buy Windows without a Web browser, one could not get
WordPerfect without a spelichecker, an Intel Pentiumprocessor with-
out floating point processing capabilities, a version of the Mac OS 8.5Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 33
without sophisticated ifie-searching capabilities,'27 an AppleMacintosh
computer without the Macintosh operating system, or a NovaBiomed-
ical BioProfile blood analyzer that performed only a single test.Simi-
larly, the district court's analysis would have condemned Microsoft for
adding to MS-DOS over time such features as memory management,
disk caching, file management, a full-screen text editor, hard-disk re-
covery utifities, and file undeletefeaturesall of which had been sold
as standalone applications byindependent software vendors.
Most of the trial testimony on the tying issue in theMicrosoft case
concerned whether Windows and IE were separate products and
whether it was possible to separate Windows and IE without "break-
ing" Windows. On appeal, the government ultimately arguedthat
Microsoft engaged in an ifiegal tie because it failed to offer a version of
Windows in which consumers were barred from direct access to the IE
features that were included in Windowsmuch like requiring automo-
bile makers to sell cars with radios that consumers cannot use.'28Legal
scholars may find disputes of this sort intellectually stimulating. Econ-
omists understand that they do not help determine whether the com-
petitive behavior at issue helps or harms consumers.
VI.Conclusions
Despite a few cases that might suggest otherwise, antitrust operates
more as a system of deterrence than as a systemof regulation. It shapes
economic behavior by attaching legal risk to certain forms of conduct
under certain conditions. A classic problem in the design of antitrust
policy is how to deter conduct that is anticompetitive and welfare-
reducing, while not discouraging the very procompetitive, welfare-
enhancing competition that antitrust is designed to protect. Thisclassic
problem persists in new-economy industries.
Firms with market power may be able to take actions that substan-
tially reduce competition and consumer welfare in the long run, and
new-economy firms may possess substantialmarket power. In decid-
ing whether they do, however, it is logically necessary for courts tofo-
cus explicitly on the vigor of dynamiccompetition. Static market-
definitionmarket-share analysis will not shed light on this issue, nor
will a simple listing of past innovations. The past vigor of dynamic
competition does not determine its present and future health, though it
does provide useful information. Unlike price/output decisions, analy-
sis of dynamic competition requires evidence about, amongother34 Evans and Schmalensee
things, the pattern of investment in developing new products (and
complements thereof), the control of critical assets (particularly intel-
lectual property and distribution channels), and the beliefs (preferably
as revealed by behavior) of market participants and informed observ-
ers about the nature and pace of innovation.
In particular, the analysis of market power in new-economy indus-
tries must consider the vulnerability of leading firms to entry powered
by drastic innovation, not just to the entry of firms producing equiva-
lent products with known processes. Analysis of this sort of fragility
may require difficult judgments about the likelihood of disruptive in-
novations in the future, but simply to assume such innovations cannot
occur is to ignore history and to impart substantial and obvious bias to
market power analysis in important sectors.
There are many things, such as price fixing, merger to monopoly,or
foreclosure of essential distribution channels, thatnew-economy com-
panies with substantial market power could in principle do to reduce
competition. Such conduct is and should be illegal, as it is in traditional
industries. But economically sound analysis of some other aspects of
business behavior must take into account important features of
new-economy industries.
Testing for predation is difficult in old-economy industries,as the
Supreme Court recognized in Matsushita (televisions) and Brooke Group
(cigarettes). Unless the courts are extremely careful, it isvery easy to
condemn intense competition that ultimately benefitsconsumers. This
danger is much greater in Schumpeterian industries. Indeed,we have
argued that there is no test for predatory conduct in winner-take-all sit-
uations that will not have as its main effect discouraging welfare-
enhancing competition. We are thus led to the conclusion that the
demonstration of healthy dynamic competition that has important
winner-take-all characteristics should be a defense to claims of preda-
tion. Lacking a defensible test, the only alternative is to throw the door
open in new-economy industries to decisions driven by debates about
whether defendants intended to exclude, to compete,or merely to sur-
viveeven though these are logically indistinguishableand undisci-
plined by serious economic analysis.
Similarly, analysis of tying claims in new-economy industries must
consider the ubiquity of integration as a competitive strategy and the
extreme risk of having judges and juries second-guess product design
decisions. We believe the deference shown to those decisions byap-
peals courts in the technological tying decisions cited above willserveSome Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 35
consumers far better than application of the Jefferson Parish test to prod-
uct integration decisions in new-economy industries.
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Nova Biomedical company web site <http://www.novabiomedical.com/biotech.
html>.
Cusumano and Yoffie (1998,p. 107).
For example, a web browser has to be able to understand web addresses(URLs) and
display HTML documents. Beginning with IE 3, Microsoft integrated these capabffities
into Windows, so that other applications (not just web browsing) coulduse these fea-
tures. Microsoft also revamped the help system in Windows to take advantage of these
features, thereby simplifying the work that application developersmust do i® order to
create help files for their applications. Designing the operating systemso that blocks of
code that perform web browsing functions also perform other functions forapplicationsSome Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis 43
programs has obvious efficiencies, but this sort of code sharing means that the code that
enables web browsing cannot be removed from Windows without disabling the system.
Microsoft Corporation, "Microsoft Windows 98 Product Guide: About the Fea-
tures," December 3, 1998; "AppleMac OSFeatures: For All Your Work, Mac OS 8.5
Comes with the Works," Apple Computer, Inc., 1998; Jim Mauro, "Solaris 7 Arrives,"
Sun World, November 1998; "Caldera OpenLinux 1.3 Product Information," Caldera Sys-
tems, Inc., 1998; "Official Red Hat 5.1 Linux Operating System Installation Guide," Red
Hat Software Inc., 1998, P. 228; "DR-DOS Overview," Caldera, Inc., 1998; Be, Inc., "The
BeOS Virtual Tour, BeOS Release 3,"1998,availableat <http://www.be.com/
products/beos_tour/screen4.html>; "Partial Microsoft Response to Written Testimony
by Government Witness John Soyring," PR Newswire, November 17, 1998; "UnixWare 7
New Features Guide," SCO, 1998.
For further discussion, see Evans, Nichols, and Schmalensee (2001).
He cited three technological tying cases, Foremost (supra note 104, at 542-43); Leasco
(supra note 102, at 1330); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter U.S. v. Microsoft 11]; See Evans, Nichols, and Schmalensee
(2001) and Hylton and Salinger (2000) for a detailed discussion of the case.
For more detailed discussion see Evans, Nichols, and Schmalensee (2001).
The district court did assert that some consumers would prefer an operating system
with no browser (e.g. some corporate users or users that have no desire to browse the
Web), but it did not assert that this demand is substantial. Supra note 68, ¶9J 151-152.
U.S. v. Microsoft II (supra note 122).
Deposition of Jon Kies, transcribed in U.S. v. Microsoft (supra note 62), December 16,
1998, A.M. Session, pp. 5-7.
"Apple Introduces Mac OS 8.5The Must-Have Upgrade," Apple Computer, Inc.
pressrelease,October14,1998,availableat<http://www.apple.com/pr-
library/1998/oct/14macos8.5.htm1>.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213, Brief for Appellees United
States and State Plaintiffs, January 12, 2001, §III.B.1. Note that consumers have indirect
access to these features when they are used by applications programsfor instance,
when Intuit's Quicken "goes to the Web."
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